Is BERT Really Robust? A Strong Baseline for Natural Language Attack on
  Text Classification and Entailment by Jin, Di et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
11
93
2v
2 
 [c
s.C
L]
  7
 Se
p 2
01
9
Is BERT Really Robust? A Strong Baseline for Natural Language Attack
on Text Classification and Entailment
Di Jin∗
MIT
jindi15@mit.edu
Zhijing Jin∗
University of Hong Kong
zhijing.jin@connect.hku.hk
Joey Tianyi Zhou
A*STAR, Singapore
zhouty@ihpc.a-star.edu.sg
Peter Szolovits
MIT
psz@mit.edu
Abstract
Machine learning algorithms are often vulner-
able to adversarial examples that have imper-
ceptible alterations from the original counter-
parts but can fool the state-of-the-art models.
It is helpful to evaluate or even improve the ro-
bustness of these models by exposing the ma-
liciously crafted adversarial examples. In this
paper, we present TEXTFOOLER, a simple
but strong baseline to generate natural adver-
sarial text. By applying it to two fundamental
natural language tasks, text classification and
textual entailment, we successfully attacked
three target models, including the powerful
pre-trained BERT, and the widely used con-
volutional and recurrent neural networks. We
demonstrate the advantages of this framework
in three ways: (1) effective—it outperforms
state-of-the-art attacks in terms of success rate
and perturbation rate, (2) utility-preserving—
it preserves semantic content and grammati-
cality, and remains correctly classified by hu-
mans, and (3) efficient—it generates adversar-
ial text with computational complexity linear
to the text length.1
1 Introduction
In the last decade, Machine Learning (ML) mod-
els have achieved remarkable success in various
tasks such as classification, regression and deci-
sion making. However, recently they have been
found vulnerable to adversarial examples that are
legitimate inputs altered by small and often im-
perceptible perturbations (Kurakin et al., 2016a,b;
Papernot et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2017). These
carefully curated examples are correctly classified
by a human observer but can fool a target model,
raising serious concerns regarding the security and
∗Equal Contribution. Order determined by swapping the
one in the previous paper (Jin et al., 2019).
1The code, pre-trained target models, and test examples
are available at https://github.com/jind11/TextFooler.
integrity of existing ML algorithms. On the other
hand, it is showed that robustness and generaliza-
tion of ML models can be improved by crafting
high-quality adversaries and including them in the
training data (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
While existing works on adversarial examples
have obtained success in the image and speech do-
mains (Szegedy et al., 2013; Carlini and Wagner,
2018), it is still challenging to deal with text
data due to its discrete nature. Formally, be-
sides the ability to fool the target models, out-
puts of a natural language attacking system should
also meet three key utility-preserving properties:
(1) human prediction consistency—prediction by
humans should remain unchanged, (2) semantic
similarity—the crafted example should bear the
same meaning as the source, as judged by hu-
mans, and (3) language fluency—generated exam-
ples should look natural and grammatical. Pre-
vious works barely conform to all three require-
ments. For example, methods such as word mis-
spelling (Li et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2018), single-
word erasure (Li et al., 2016), and phrase insertion
and removal (Liang et al., 2017) result in unnatu-
ral sentences. Moreover, there is almost no work
that attacks the newly-risen BERT model on text
classification.
In this work, we present TEXTFOOLER, a sim-
ple but strong baseline for natural language attack
in the black-box setting, a common case where no
model architecture or parameters are accessible.
We design a more comprehensive paradigm to cre-
ate both semantically and syntactically similar ad-
versarial examples that meet the aforementioned
three desiderata. Specifically, we first identify the
important words for the target model and then pri-
oritize to replace them with the most semantically
similar and grammatically correct words until the
prediction is altered. We successfully applied this
framework to attack three state-of-the-art models
in five text classification tasks and two textual en-
tailment tasks, respectively. On the adversarial ex-
amples, we can reduce the accuracy of almost all
target models in all tasks to below 10% with only
less than 20% of the original words perturbed. In
addition, we validate that the generated examples
are (1) correctly classified by human evaluators,
(2) semantically similar to the original text, and
(3) grammatically acceptable by human judges.
Our main contributions are listed as follows:
• We propose a simple but strong base-
line, TEXTFOOLER, to generate high-profile
utility-preserving adversarial examples that
force the target models to make wrong pre-
dictions under the black-box setting.
• We evaluate TEXTFOOLER on three state-of-
the-art deep learning models over five pop-
ular text classification tasks and two textual
entailment tasks, and it achieved the state-
of-the-art attack success rate and perturbation
rate.
• We propose a comprehensive four-way au-
tomatic and three-way human evaluation
of language adversarial attacks to evalu-
ate the effectiveness, efficiency, and utility-
preserving properties of our system.
• We open-source the code, pre-trained target
models, and test samples for the convenience
of future benchmarking.
2 Method
2.1 Problem Formulation
Given a corpus of N sentences X =
{X1,X2, . . . ,XN}, and a corresponding set
of N labels Y = {Y1, Y2, . . . , YN}, we have a
pre-trained model F : X → Y , which maps the
input text space X to the label space Y .
For a sentence X ∈ X , a valid adversarial ex-
ample Xadv should conform to the following re-
quirements:
F (Xadv) 6= F (X), and Sim(Xadv ,X) ≥ ǫ, (1)
where Sim : X × X → (0, 1) is a similarity
function and ǫ is the minimum similarity between
the original and adversarial examples. In the natu-
ral language domain, Sim is often a semantic and
syntactic similarity function.
2.2 Threat Model
Under the black-box setting, the attacker is not
aware of the model architecture, parameters, or
training data. It can only query the target model
with supplied inputs, getting as results the predic-
tions and corresponding confidence scores.
The proposed approach for adversarial text gen-
eration is shown in Algorithm 1, and consists of
the two main steps:
Step 1: Word Importance Ranking (line 1-6)
Given a sentence of n words X =
{w1, w2, . . . , wn}, we observe that only some
key words act as influential signals for the pre-
diction model F , echoing with the discovery
of (Niven and Kao, 2019) that BERT attends to
the statistical cues of some words. Therefore,
we create a selection mechanism to choose the
words that most significantly influence the final
prediction results. Using this selection process,
we minimize the alterations, and thus maintain
the semantic similarity as much as possible.
Note that the selection of important words is
trivial in a white-box scenario, as it can be eas-
ily solved by inspecting the gradients of the model
F , while most other words are irrelevant. How-
ever, under the more common black-box set up
in our paper, the model gradients are unavailable.
Therefore, we create a selection mechanism as fol-
lows. We use the score Iwi to measure the influ-
ence of a word wi ∈ X towards the classification
result F (X) = Y . We denote the sentence af-
ter deleting the word wi as X\wi = X \ {wi} =
{w1, . . . , wi−1, wi+1, . . . wn}, and use FY (·) to
represent the prediction score for the Y label.
The importance score Iwi is therefore calculated
as the prediction change before and after deleting
the word wi, which is formally defined as follows,
Iwi =


FY (X)− FY (X\wi),
if F (X) = F (X\wi) = Y
(FY (X)− FY (X\wi)) + (FY¯ (X\wi)− FY¯ (X)),
if F (X) = Y, F (X\wi) = Y¯ , and Y 6= Y¯ .
(2)
After ranking the words by their importance
score, we further filter out stop words derived
from NLTK2 and spaCy3 libraries such as “the”,
“when”, and “none”. This simple step of filtering
is important to avoid grammar destruction.
2https://www.nltk.org/
3https://spacy.io/
Algorithm 1 TEXTFOOLER
Input: Sentence example X = {w1, w2, ..., wn}, the corre-
sponding ground truth label Y , target model F , sentence
similarity function Sim, sentence similarity threshold ǫ,
word embeddings Emb over the vocabulary V .
Output: Adversarial example Xadv
1: Initialization: Xadv ← X
2: for each word wi inX do
3: Compute the importance score Iwi via Eq.2
4: end for
5:
6: Create a set W of all words wi ∈ X sorted by the de-
scending order of their importance score Iwi .
7: Filter out the stop words inW .
8: for each word wj inW do
9: Initiate the set of candidates CANDIDATES by ex-
tracting the top N synonyms using CosSim(Embwj ,
Embword) for each word in V .
10: CANDIDATES← POSFilter(CANDIDATES)
11: FINCANDIDATES← { }
12: for ck in CANDIDATES do
13: X ′ ← Replace wj with ck inXadv
14: if Sim(X ′, Xadv) > ǫ then
15: Add ck to the set FINCANDIDATES
16: Yk ← F (X
′)
17: Pk ← FYk (X
′)
18: end if
19: end for
20: if there exists ck whose prediction result Yk 6= Y
then
21: In FINCANDIDATES, only keep the candidates ck
whose prediction result Yk 6= Y
22: c∗ ← argmax
c∈FINCANDIDATES
Sim(X,X ′wj→c)
23: Xadv ← Replace wj with c
∗ inXadv
24: return Xadv
25: else if PYk (Xadv) > min
ck∈FINCANDIDATES
Pk then
26: c∗ ← argmin
ck∈FINCANDIDATES
Pk
27: Xadv ← Replace wj with c
∗ inXadv
28: end if
29: end for
30: return None
Step 2: Word Transformer (line 7-30)
For a given word wi ∈ X with a high impor-
tance score obtained in Step 1, we need to design a
word replacement mechanism. A suitable replace-
ment word needs to fulfill the following criteria:
it should (1) have similar semantic meaning with
the original one, (2) fit within the surrounding con-
text, and (3) force the target model to make wrong
predictions. In order to select replacement words
that meet such criteria, we propose the following
workflow.
Synonym Extraction We gather a candidate set
CANDIDATES for all possible replacements of the
selected word wi. CANDIDATES is initiated with
N closest synonyms according to the cosine simi-
larity between wi and every other word in the vo-
cabulary.
To represent the words, we use word embed-
dings from (Mrksˇic´ et al., 2016). These word vec-
tors are specially curated for finding synonyms, as
they achieve the state-of-the-art performance on
SimLex-999, a dataset designed to measure how
well different models judge semantic similarity
between words (Hill et al., 2015).
Using this set of embedding vectors, we iden-
tify topN synonyms whose cosine similarity with
w are greater than δ. Note that enlarging N or
lowering δ would both generate more diverse syn-
onym candidates; however, the semantic similarity
between the adversary and the original sentence
would decrease. In our experiments, empirically
settingN to be 50 and δ to be 0.7 strikes a balance
between diversity and semantic similarity control.
POS Checking In the set CANDIDATES of the
word wi, we only keep the ones with the same
part-of-speech (POS) as wi. This step is to assure
that the grammar of the text is mostly maintained
(line 10 in Algorithm 1).
Semantic Similarity Checking For each word
c ∈ CANDIDATES, we substitute it for wi in the
sentence X, and obtain the adversarial example
Xadv = {w1, . . . , wi−1, c, wi+1, . . . , wn}. We use
the target model F to compute the corresponding
prediction scores F (Xadv). We also calculate the
sentence semantic similarity between the source
X and adversarial counterpart Xadv . Specifi-
cally, we use Universal Sentence Encoder (USE)
(Cer et al., 2018) to encode the two sentences into
high dimensional vectors and use their cosine sim-
ilarity score as an approximation of semantic sim-
ilarity. The words resulting in similarity scores
above a preset threshold ǫ are placed into the fi-
nal candidate pool FINCANDIDATES (line 11-19
in Algorithm 1).
Finalization of Adversarial Examples In the
final candidate pool FINCANDIDATES, if there ex-
ists any candidate that can already alter the predic-
tion of the target model, then we select the word
with the highest semantic similarity score among
these winning candidates. But if not, then we se-
lect the word with the least confidence score of
label y as the best replacement word for wi, and
repeat Step 2 to transform the next selected word
(line 20-30 in Algorithm 1).
Overall, the algorithm first uses Step 1 to rank
the words by their importance scores, and then re-
peats Step 2 to find replacements for each word in
the sentence X until the prediction of the target
model is altered.
3 Experiments
3.1 Tasks
We study the effectiveness of our adversarial at-
tack on two important NLP tasks, text classifica-
tion and textual entailment. The dataset statistics
are summarized in Table 1. Following the prac-
tice in (Alzantot et al., 2018), we evaluate our al-
gorithm on a set of 1,000 examples randomly se-
lected from the test set.
Task Dataset Train Test Avg Len
Classification
AG’s News 30K 1.9K 43
Fake News 18.8K 2K 885
MR 9K 1K 20
IMDB 25K 25K 215
Yelp 560K 38K 152
Entailment
SNLI 570K 3K 8
MultiNLI 433K 10K 11
Table 1: Overview of the datasets.
3.1.1 Text Classification
To study the robustness of our model, we use text
classification datasets with various properties, in-
cluding news topic classification, fake news detec-
tion, and sentence- and document-level sentiment
analysis, with average text length ranging from
tens to hundreds of words.
• AG’s News (AG): Sentence-level classi-
fication with regard to four news top-
ics: World, Sports, Business, and Sci-
ence/Technology. Following the practice of
(Zhang et al., 2015), we concatenate the title
and description fields for each news article.
• Fake News Detection (Fake): Document-
level classification on whether a news article
is fake or not. The dataset comes from the
Kaggle Fake News Challenge.4
• MR: Sentence-level sentiment classifica-
tion on positive and negative movie re-
views (Pang and Lee, 2005). We use 90% of
the data as the training set and 10% as the test
set, following the practice in (Li et al., 2018).
• IMDB: Document-level sentiment classifica-
tion on positive and negative movie reviews.5
4https://www.kaggle.com/c/fake-news/data
5https://datasets.imdbws.com/
• Yelp Polarity (Yelp): Document-level senti-
ment classification on positive and negative
reviews (Zhang et al., 2015). Reviews with a
rating of 1 and 2 are labeled negative and 4
and 5 positive.
3.1.2 Textual Entailment
• SNLI: A dataset of 570K sentence pairs de-
rived from image captions. The task is
to judge the relationship between two sen-
tences: whether the second sentence can
be derived from entailment, contradiction,
or neutral relationship with the first sen-
tence (Bowman et al., 2015).
• MultiNLI: A multi-genre entailment
dataset with a coverage of transcribed
speech, popular fiction, and government
reports (Williams et al., 2017). Compared to
SNLI, it contains more linguistic complexity
with various written and spoken English text.
3.2 Attacking Target Models
For each dataset, we train three state-of-the-art
models on the training set, and achieved test set ac-
curacy scores similar to the original implementa-
tion, as shown in Table 2. We then generate adver-
sarial examples which are semantically similar to
the test set to attack the trained models and make
them generate different results.
WordCNN WordLSTM BERT
AG 92.5 93.1 94.6
Fake 99.9 99.9 99.9
MR 79.9 82.2 85.8
IMDB 89.7 91.2 92.2
Yelp 95.2 96.6 96.1
InferSent ESIM BERT
SNLI 84.6 88.0 90.7
MultiNLI 71.1/71.5 76.9/76.5 83.9/84.1
Table 2: Original Accuracy of target models on the
standard test sets.
On the sentence classification task, we tar-
get at three models: word-based convolutional
neural network (WordCNN) (Kim, 2014), word-
based long-short term memory (WordLSTM)
(Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997), and the
state-of-the-art Bidirectional Encoder Represen-
tations from Transformers (BERT) (Devlin et al.,
2018).
For the WordCNN model, we used three win-
dow sizes of 3, 4, and 5, and 100 filters for
each window size with dropout of 0.3. For
WordCNN WordLSTM BERT
MR IMDB Yelp AG Fake MR IMDB Yelp AG Fake MR IMDB Yelp AG Fake
Original Accuracy 78.0 89.2 93.8 91.5 96.7 80.7 89.8 96.0 91.3 94.0 86.0 90.9 95.6 94.2 97.8
After-Attack Accuracy 2.8 0.0 1.1 1.5 15.9 3.1 0.3 2.1 3.8 16.4 11.5 13.6 6.8 12.5 19.3
% Perturbed Words 14.3 3.5 8.3 15.2 11.0 14.9 5.1 10.6 18.6 10.1 16.7 6.1 12.8 22.0 11.7
Semantic Similarity 0.68 0.89 0.82 0.76 0.82 0.67 0.87 0.79 0.63 0.80 0.65 0.86 0.74 0.57 0.76
Query Number 123 524 487 228 3367 126 666 629 273 3343 166 1134 743 357 4403
Average Text Length 20 215 152 43 885 20 215 152 43 885 20 215 152 43 885
Table 3: Automatic evaluation results of the attack system on text classification datasets, including the original
model prediction accuracy before being attacked (“Original Accuracy”), the model accuracy after the adversarial
attack (“After-Attack Accuracy”), the percentage of perturbed words with respect to the original sentence length
(“% PerturbedWords”), and the semantic similarity between original and adversarial samples (“Semantic Similar-
ity”).
InferSent ESIM BERT
SNLI MultiNLI (m/mm) SNLI MultiNLI (m/mm) SNLI MultiNLI (m/mm)
Original Accuracy 84.3 70.9/69.6 86.5 77.6/75.8 89.4 85.1/82.1
After-Attack Accuracy 3.5 6.7/6.9 5.1 7.7/7.3 4.0 9.6/8.3
% Perturbed Words 18.0 13.8/14.6 18.1 14.5/14.6 18.5 15.2/14.6
Semantic Similarity 0.50 0.61/0.59 0.47 0.59/0.59 0.45 0.57/0.58
Query Number 57 70/83 58 72/87 60 78/86
Average Text Length 8 11/12 8 11/12 8 11/12
Table 4: Automatic evaluation results of the attack system on textual entailment datasets. “m” means matched, and
“mm” means mismatched, which are the two variants of the MultiNLI development set.
the WordLSTM, we used a 1-layer bidirectional
LSTMwith 150 hidden units and a dropout of 0.3.
For both models, we used the 200 dimensional
Glove word embeddings pre-trained on 6B tokens
fromWikipedia and Gigawords (Pennington et al.,
2014). We used the 12-layer BERT model with
768 hidden units and 12 heads, with 110M param-
eters, which is called the base-uncased version6.
We also implemented three target mod-
els on the textual entailment task: stan-
dard InferSent7 (Conneau et al., 2017),
ESIM8 (Chen et al., 2016), and fine-tuned
BERT.
3.3 Setup of Automatic Evaluation
We first report the accuracy of the target models
on the original test samples before attack as the
original accuracy. Then we measure the accuracy
of the target models against the adversarial sam-
ples crafted from the test samples, denoted as the
“after-attack accuracy”. By comparing these two
accuracy scores, we can evaluate how successful
the attack is, — the larger gap between the origi-
nal and after-attack accuracy signals the more suc-
cessful our attack is. Apart from these accuracies,
we also report the perturbed word percentage as
6https://github.com/huggingface/pytorch-pretrained-
BERT
7https://github.com/facebookresearch/InferSent
8https://github.com/coetaur0/ESIM
the ratio of the number of perturbed words to the
text length. Furthermore, we apply USE9 to mea-
sure the semantic similarity between the original
and adversarial texts. These two metrics, the per-
turbed words percentage and the semantic similar-
ity score, together evaluate how semantically sim-
ilar the original and adversarial texts are. We fi-
nally report the number of queries the attack sys-
tem made to the target model and fetches the out-
put probability scores. This metric can reveal the
efficiency of the attack model.
3.4 Setup of Human Evaluation
We conduct human evaluation on three criteria: se-
mantic similarity, grammaticality, and classifica-
tion accuracy. We randomly select 100 test sen-
tences of each task to generate adversarial exam-
ples, one targeting WordLSTM on MR dataset and
another targeting BERT on SNLI.We first shuffled
a mix of original and adversarial texts and asked
human judges to rate the grammaticality of them
on a Likert scale of 1 − 5, similar to the prac-
tice of (Gagnon-Marchand et al., 2018). Next, we
evaluate the classification consistency by asking
humans to classify each example in the shuffled
mix of the original and adversarial sentences and
then calculate the consistency rate of both classi-
fication results. Lastly, we evaluated the semantic
similarity of the original and adversarial sentences
9https://tfhub.dev/google/ universal-sentence-encoder
by asking humans to judge whether the generated
adversarial sentence is similar, ambiguous, or dis-
similar to the source sentence. Each task is com-
pleted by two independent human judges who are
native English speakers.
4 Results
4.1 Automatic Evaluation
The main results of black-box attacks in terms of
automatic evaluation on five text classification and
two textual entailment tasks are summarized in Ta-
ble 3 and 4, respectively. Overall, as can be seen
from our results, TEXTFOOLER achieves a high
success rate when attacking with a limited num-
ber of modifications on both tasks. No matter how
long the text sequence is, and no matter how ac-
curate the target model is, TEXTFOOLER can al-
ways reduce the accuracy from the state-of-the-art
values to below 15% (except on the Fake dataset)
with less than 20% word perturbation ratio (except
the AG dataset under the BERT target model). For
instance, it only perturbs 5.1% of the words on
average when reducing the accuracy from 89.8%
to only 0.3% on the IMDB dataset against the
WordLSTM model. Notably, our attack system
makes the WordCNN model on the IMDB dataset
totally wrong (reaching the accuracy of 0%) with
only 3.5% word perturbation rate. In the IMDB
dataset which has an average length of 215 words,
the system only perturbed 10 words or fewer per
sample to conduct successful attacks. This means
that our attack system can successfully mislead
the classifiers into assigning wrong predictions via
subtle manipulation.
Even for BERT, which has achieved seemingly
“robust” performance compared with the non-
pretrained models such as WordLSTM and Word-
CNN, our attack model can still reduce its predic-
tion accuracy by about 5–7 times on the classi-
fication task (e.g., from 95.6% to 6.8% for Yelp
dataset) and about 9-22 times on the NLI task
(e.g., from 89.4% to 4.0% for SNLI dataset),
which is unprecedented. Our curated adversarial
examples can contribute to the study of the inter-
pretability of the BERT model (Feng et al., 2018).
Another two observations can be drawn from
Table 3 and 4. (1) Models with higher original
accuracy is, in general, more difficult to be at-
tacked. For instance, the after-attack accuracy and
perturbed word ratio are both higher for the BERT
model compared with WordCNN on all datasets.
(2) The after-attack accuracy of the Fake dataset is
much higher than all other classification datasets
for all three target models. We found in experi-
ments that it is easy for the attack system to con-
vert a real news to a fake one, whereas the reverse
process is much harder, which is in line with intu-
ition.
Comparing the semantic similarity scores and
the perturbed word ratios in both Table 3 and 4, we
find that the two results have a high positive corre-
lation. Empirically, when the text length is longer
than 10 words, the semantic similarity measure-
ment becomes more stable. Since the average text
lengths of text classification datasets are all above
20 words and those of textual entailment datasets
are around or below 10 words, we need to treat
the semantic similarity scores of these two tasks
individually. Therefore, we performed a linear re-
gression analysis between the word perturbation
ratio and semantic similarity for each task and ob-
tained r-squared values of 0.94 and 0.97 for text
classification and textual entailment tasks, respec-
tively. Such high values of r-squared reveal that
our proposed semantic similarity has high corre-
lation (negative) with the perturbed words ratio,
which can both be good automatic measurements
to evaluate the degree of alterations of the original
text.
We include the average text length of each
dataset in the last row of Table 3 and 4 so that it
can be conveniently compared against the query
number. The query number is almost linear to the
text lengthm, with a ratio between 2 and 8. No-
tably, the longer the text is, the smaller this ratio,
which validates the efficiency of TEXTFOOLER.
Dataset Model Success Rate % Perturbed
IMDB
(Li et al., 2018) 86.7 6.9
(Alzantot et al., 2018) 97.0 14.7
Ours 99.7 5.1
SNLI
(Alzantot et al., 2018) 70.0 23.0
Ours 95.8 18.0
Yelp
(Kuleshov et al., 2018) 74.8 -
Ours 97.8 10.6
Table 5: Comparison of our attack system against other
published systems. The target model for IMDB and
Yelp is LSTM and SNLI is InferSent.
Benchmark Comparison We compared
TEXTFOOLER with the previous state-of-the-art
adversarial attack systems against the same
target model and dataset. Our baselines in-
clude (Li et al., 2018) that generates misspelled
words by character- and word-level perturbation,
Movie Review (Positive (POS)↔ Negative (NEG))
Original [Label: NEG] The characters, cast in impossibly contrived situations, are totally estranged from reality.
Attack [Label: POS] The characters, cast in impossibly engineered circumstances, are fully estranged from
reality.
Original [Label: POS] It cuts to the knot of what it actually means to face your scares, and to ride the overwhelm-
ing metaphorical wave that life wherever it takes you.
Attack [Label: NEG] It cuts to the core of what it actually means to face your fears, and to ride the big metaphor-
ical wave that life wherever it takes you.
SNLI (Entailment (ENT), Neutral (NEU), Contradiction (CON))
Premise Two small boys in blue soccer uniforms use a wooden set of steps to wash their hands.
Original [Label: CON] The boys are in band uniforms.
Adversary [Label: ENT] The boys are in band garment.
Premise A child with wet hair is holding a butterfly decorated beach ball.
Original [Label: NEU] The child is at the beach.
Adversary [Label: ENT] The youngster is at the shore.
Table 6: Examples of original and adversarial sentences from MR (WordLSTM) and SNLI (BERT) datasets.
(Alzantot et al., 2018) that iterates through every
word in the sentence and find its perturbation,
and (Kuleshov et al., 2018) that uses word re-
placement by greedy heuristics. From the results
in Table 5, we can see that our system beats the
previous state-of-the-art models by both the attack
success rate (calculated by dividing the number
of wrong predictions by the total number of
adversarial examples) and perturbed word ratio.
4.2 Human Evaluation
We sampled 100 adversarial examples on the MR
dataset with the WordLSTM and 100 examples on
SNLI with BERT. We verified the quality of our
examples via three experiments. First, we ask hu-
man judges to give a grammaticality score of a
shuffled mix of original and adversarial text.
MR SNLI
Source Text (WordLSTM) (BERT)
Original 4.22 4.50
Adversarial 4.01 4.27
Table 7: Grammaticality of original and adversarial ex-
amples for MR (WordLSTM) and SNLI (BERT) on a
1− 5 scale.
As shown in Table 7, the grammaticality of the
adversarial text are close to the original text on
both datasets. By sensibly substituting synonyms,
TEXTFOOLER generates smooth outputs such as
“the big metaphorical wave” in Table 6.
We then asked the human raters to assign classi-
fication labels to a shuffled set of original and ad-
versarial samples. The overall agreement between
the labels of the original sentence and the adver-
sarial sentence is relatively high, with 92% on MR
and 85% on SNLI. Though our adversarial exam-
ples are not perfect in every case, this shows that
majorities of adversarial sentences have the same
attribute as the original sentences from humans’
perspective. Table 6 shows typical examples of
sentences with almost the same meanings that re-
sult in contradictory classifications by the target
model.
Lastly, we asked the judges to decide whether
each adversarial sample retains the meaning of the
original sentence. They need to decide whether
the synthesized adversarial example is similar, am-
biguous, or dissimilar to the provided original sen-
tence. We regard similar as 1, ambiguous as 0.5,
and dissimilar as 0, and obtained sentence similar-
ity scores of 0.91 on MR and 0.86 on SNLI, which
shows the perceived difference between original
and adversarial text is small.
5 Discussion
5.1 Ablation Study
5.1.1 Word Importance Ranking
To validate the effectiveness of Step 1 in Algo-
rithm 1, i.e., the word importance ranking, we
remove this step and instead randomly select the
words in text to perturb. We keep the perturbed
word ratio and Step 2 the same. We use BERT as
the target model and test on three datasets: MR,
AG, and SNLI. The results are summarized in Ta-
ble 8. After removing Step 1 and instead randomly
selecting the words to perturb, the after-attack ac-
curacy increases by more than 45% on all three
datasets, which reveals that the attack becomes
ineffective without the word importance ranking
step. The word importance ranking process is cru-
cial to the algorithm in that it can accurately and
efficiently locate the words which cast the most
significant effect on the predictions of the target
model. This strategy can also reduce the number
of perturbed words so as to maintain the semantic
similarity as much as possible.
MR AG SNLI
% Perturbed Words 16.7 22.0 18.5
Original Accuracy 86.0 94.2 89.4
After-Attack Accuracy 11.5 12.5 4.0
After-Attack Accuracy (Random) 68.3 80.8 59.2
Table 8: Comparison of the after-attack accuracies be-
fore and after removing the word importance ranking
of Algorithm 1. For control, Step 2 and the perturbed
words ratio are kept the same. BERT model is used as
the target model.
5.1.2 Semantic Similarity Constraint
In Step 2 of Algorithm 1, for every possible word
replacement, we check the semantic similarity be-
tween the newly generated sample and the orig-
inal text, and adopt this replacement only when
the similarity is above a preset threshold ǫ. We
found that this strategy can effectively filter out ir-
relevant synonyms to the selected word. As we
can see from the examples in Table 9, the syn-
onyms extracted by word embeddings are noisy,
so directly injecting them into the text as adver-
sarial samples would probably shift the semantic
meaning significantly. By applying the sentence-
level semantic similarity constraint, we can obtain
more related synonyms as good replacements. In
future work, we will also explore the use of ELMo
(Peters et al., 2018) or BERT (Devlin et al., 2018)
to calculate the sentence similarity scores.
Original like a south of the border melrose place
Adversarial like a south of the border melrose spot
- Sim. like a south of the border melrose mise
Original their computer animated faces are very expressive
Adversarial their computer animated face are very affective
- Sim. their computer animated faces are very diction
Table 9: Qualitative comparison of adversarial attacks
with and without the semantic similarity constraint (“-
Sim.”). We highlight the original word, TextFooler’s
replacement, and the replacement without semantic
constraint.
5.2 Transferability
We examined transferability of adversarial text,
that is, whether adversarial samples curated based
on one model can also fool another. For this,
we collected the adversarial examples from IMDB
and SNLI test sets that are wrongly predicted by
one target model and then measured the predic-
tion accuracy of them against the other two target
models. As we can see from the results in the Ta-
ble 10, there is a moderate degree of transferability
between models, and the transferability is higher
in the textual entailment task than in the text clas-
sification task. Moreover, the adversarial samples
generated based on the model with higher predic-
tion accuracy, i.e. the BERT model here, show
higher transferability.
WordCNN WordLSTM BERT
IMDB
WordCNN 0.0 84.9 90.2
WordLSTM 74.9 0.0 87.9
BERT 84.1 85.1 0.0
InferSent ESIM BERT
SNLI
InferSent 0.0 62.7 67.7
ESIM 49.4 0.0 59.3
BERT 58.2 54.6 0.0
Table 10: Transferability of adversarial examples on
IMDB and SNLI dataset. Row i and column j is the
accuracy of adversaries generated for model i evaluated
on model j.
5.3 Adversarial Training
Our work casts insights on how to better improve
the original models through these adversarial ex-
amples. We conducted a preliminary experiment
on adversarial training, by feeding the models both
the original data and the adversarial examples, to
see whether the original models can gain more
robustness. We collected the adversarial exam-
ples curated from the MR and SNLI training sets
that fooled BERT and added them to the orig-
inal training set. We then used the expanded
data to train BERT from scratch and attacked this
adversarially-trained model. As is seen in the at-
tack results in Table 11, both the after-attack ac-
curacy and perturbed words ratio after adversarial
re-training get worse, indicating that the greater
difficulty to attack. This reveals one of the po-
tency of our attack system,— we can enhance the
robustness of a model to future attacks by training
it with the generated adversarial examples.
MR SNLI
Af. Acc. Pert. Af. Acc. Pert.
Original 11.5 16.7 4.0 18.5
+ Adv. Training 18.7 21.0 8.3 20.1
Table 11: Comparison of the after-attack accuracy
(“Af. Acc.”) and percentage of perturbed words
(“Pert.”) of original training (“Original”) and adver-
sarial training (“+ Adv. Train”) of BERT model on MR
and SNLI dataset.
5.4 Error Analysis
Our adversarial samples are susceptible to three
types of errors: word sense ambiguity, grammat-
ical error, and task-sensitive content shift. Al-
though large thesauri are available, a word usually
has many meanings, with a set of synonyms for
each word sense. One example can be the trans-
fer from an original sentence “One man shows
the ransom money to the other” to the synthesized
“One man testify the ransom money to the other”,
where “testify” in this case is not the appropriate
synonym of “show”.
Grammatical errors are also frequent in text
generation. For example, the sentence “A man
with headphones is biking” and “Aman with head-
phones is motorcycle” differ by the word “biking”,
which can be both a noun and a verb, as well as
a fairly similar word to “motorcycle”. As future
work, some carefully designed heuristics can be
applied to filter out grammatical errors.
Content shift can be seen in a task-specific situ-
ation. In the sentiment classification task, a change
of words might not affect the overall sentiment,
whereas in the task of textual entailment, the sub-
stitution of words might result in a fundamental
difference. For example, if the premise is “a kid
with red hat is running”, and the original hypothe-
sis is “a kid is running (ENTAILMENT)”, then if the
adversarial example becomes “a girl is running”,
the sensible result turns into NEUTRAL instead.
6 Related Work
Adversarial attack has been extensively studied
in computer vision (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Kurakin et al., 2016a; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2017). Most works make gradient-based pertur-
bation on continuous input spaces (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014).
Adversarial attack on discrete data such as text
is more challenging. Inspired by the approaches
in computer vision, early work in language adver-
sarial attack focus on variations of gradient-based
methods. For example, Zhao et al. transform in-
put data into a latent representation by generative
adversarial networks (GANs), and then retrieved
adversaries close to the original instance in the la-
tent space.
Other works observed the intractability of
GAN-based models on text and the shift in se-
mantics in the latent representations, so heuris-
tic methods such as scrambling, misspelling, or
removing words were proposed (Ebrahimi et al.,
2017; Alzantot et al., 2018; Li et al., 2016, 2018).
Instead of manually designing these rules,
Ribeiro et al. automatically craft the semantically
equivalent adversarial rules from the machine gen-
erated paraphrases based on the back-translation
technique from the machine translation field. By
human evaluation, they demonstrate that the qual-
ity of the adversaries created by their rules is better
than that generated by human. More interestingly,
Feng et al. used the way to produce adversarial ex-
amples to help improve the interpretability of neu-
ral models by encouraging high entropy outputs on
the adversaries.
7 Conclusions
Overall, we study adversarial attacks against state-
of-the-art text classification and textual entailment
models under the black-box setting. Extensive
experiments demonstrate that the effectiveness of
our proposed system, TEXTFOOLER, at generat-
ing targeted adversarial texts. Human studies val-
idated that the generated adversarial texts are leg-
ible, grammatical, and similar in meaning to the
original texts.
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